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Abstract
In addition to their benefits, optimization systems can have negative economic,
moral, social, and political effects on populations as well as their environments.
Frameworks like fairness have been proposed to aid service providers in address-
ing subsequent bias and discrimination during data collection and algorithm de-
sign. However, recent reports of neglect, unresponsiveness, and malevolence cast
doubt on whether service providers can effectively implement fairness solutions.
These reports invite us to revisit assumptions made about the service providers in
fairness solutions. Namely, that service providers have (i) the incentives or (ii) the
means to mitigate optimization externalities. Moreover, the environmental impact
of these systems suggests that we need (iii) novel frameworks that consider sys-
tems other than algorithmic decision-making and recommender systems, and (iv)
solutions that go beyond removing related algorithmic biases. Going forward, we
propose Protective Optimization Technologies that enable optimization subjects
to defend against negative consequences of optimization systems.
1 Misaligned trust and incentives: The problem of optimization systems
Fairness solutions emerge as a response to the problems arising from the current widespread ap-
plication of machine learning. Research on fairness has pre-eminently focused on decision-making
and recommender systems [2–4]. Such systems take data from one individual as input and output a
decision or a recommendation, based on some algorithm, that has a direct impact on that individual.
For example, recidivism prediction systems, which are well studied in fairness literature as well as
news media, take as input the data of a criminal defendant and predict how likely the individual is
to reoffend [5]. Fairness tools act on the algorithm to prevent or minimize inequitable outcomes for
different (historically marginalized) groups [6, 7]. Over the last years, researchers have proposed
various definitions of fairness [4, 6, 8], and there is a lack of consensus as to what the paradigm
encompasses. As such, we discuss fairness in broad terms and focus on the state-of-the-art. We
illustrate how the field’s current focus limits fairness’ ability to mitigate negative outcomes of opti-
mization systems on individuals, populations, and environments.
Recent reports about popular technological service providers invite us to rethink the scope of fair-
ness frameworks and their underlying trust models. Waze, the traffic app owned by Google, is
frequently reported to disregard the negative impacts of routing vehicles through streets that are
inadequate for heavy traffic [9]. A class action lawsuit against Facebook claims that, in order to
increase ad revenue, the company inflated the amount of time users viewed videos by as much as
900% [10]. Due to imbalance in the data used to create their maps, Poke´mon Go is known to spawn
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less Poke´mon in rural areas and majority-black neighborhoods [11, 12], illustrating how inequality
is not limited to employment, income, and housing, but extends to who has leisure time and how it is
spent [13]. Despite their attempts to address this biased treatment using traditional means to process
their data, Niantic, the company behind the game, has a difficult time fixing the issue [14]. These
stories highlight a number of problems: the Waze story presents a system that may treat non-users
and their environments unfairly; the Facebook story shows that even in the presence of powerful
stakeholders and financial incentives, service providers may behave dishonestly or escape recourse
by claiming these are machine learning accidents [10]; and the Poke´mon Go example demonstrates
that even when providers are willing, solving fairness problems may require looking beyond possi-
ble pre-processing of the input data. These examples cast doubt on the ability of service providers
to honestly, or effectively, apply fairness solutions to their systems.
These are examples of optimization systems: they go beyond simple decision making or recommen-
dation, incorporate real-time feedback from users [15], interact with the environment in which they
are deployed, and are optimizing over variables that are constantly changing. Optimization systems
increasingly rely on machine learning to make operational decisions like the selection of software
features, the orchestration of cloud usage, the design of user interaction and growth planning [16],
etc. In contrast to traditional information systems, which treat the world as a static place to be known
and focus on storage, processing, transport, and organizing information, optimization systems con-
sider the world as a place to sense and co-create. They seek maximum extraction of economic value
by optimizing the capture and manipulation of actions and environments [17, 18]. Ride sharing
apps rely on optimization to decide on the prices of rides; navigation apps to propose best routes;
banks to decide whether to grant a loan; and advertising networks to select the best advertisement to
show a user, all driven by an interest in the greatest return on investment. As a consequence, for the
optimization system providers (OSPs), profit maximization and fairness may easily be conflicting
goals, i.e., OSPs may lack the necessary incentives to apply fairness solutions honestly or at all.
Furthermore, optimization systems apply a logic of operational control that focuses on outcomes
rather than the process [19]. While this introduces efficiency and allows systems to scale, it also
poses social risks and harms such as social sorting, mass manipulation, majority dominance, and
minority erasure. In summary, these systems create substantial externalities — situations in which
the actions of a group of agents, e.g., consumption, production, and investment decisions, have
“significant repercussions on agents outside of the group” [20].
Some common externalities intrinsic to optimization systems are i) disregard for non-users and en-
vironments which results in non-users being outside the optimization model [9]; ii) disregard for
certain users by providing the most benefit to a subset of “high-value” users [21, 22]; iii) external-
ization of exploration risks to users and environments, in which the systems benefit from experi-
mentation while putting exploration risks associated with environmental unknowns onto users [23];
iv) distributional shift, in which optimization systems are built on data from a particular domain
and flounder when deployed in a different environment [24–26]; v) unfair distribution of errors, in
which algorithms learn to maximize success by favoring the most likely option, e.g., misclassify
minorities while maintaining high accuracy [2, 27]; vi) promotion of unintended actions to fulfill
intended outcomes, where systems find shortcuts to their optimization goals, also known as “reward
hacking” [28, 29]; and vii) mass data collection, where, in the pursuit of more accurate inferences,
resources and power are concentrated to a few data holders [19].
Such externalities that arise in optimization systems are beyond unfairness due to the inputs and
outputs of the algorithms, or may not be caused by algorithmic unfairness at all. That is, an “unbi-
ased” algorithm can still have unfair consequences or externalities. Such problems cannot be solved
by diligent, and less so by dishonest, service providers. Instead, they require additional models and
techniques to reason about strategies to counter them.
2 Solutions by design?
We argue that OSPs may not have the incentives or means to apply fairness solutions to their sys-
tems and that such solutions may not be sufficient to address the many externalities of optimization
systems. We discuss in greater detail why fairness, or more broadly solutions by design, may fall
short of the task.
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Existing framings of externalities do not capture conflicts between the goals of the system and
fairness. Typically, AI safety experts argue that the harms of optimization systems arise because
OSPs “choose ‘wrong’ objective functions” or “lack sufficient good-quality data”, i.e., flaws and
accidents amount to poor design [10, 28]. Fairness frameworks often follow suit. One response,
therefore, is to devise countermeasures that allow OSPs to prevent or minimize the occurrence of
these ‘flaws’ [28], with the underlying assumption that, given adequate tools and means, OSPs will
strive to ‘fix’ or ‘correct’ their systems. While developing methods that can improve the design
of optimization systems is absolutely necessary, this alone is insufficient to counter optimization
systems’ negative externalities. The accidents framing dismisses the possibility that those design
choices may in fact be intentional, i.e., that the objective functions underlying optimization systems
may actively aspire for asocial or negative environmental outcomes. OSPs may lack incentives to
maximize society’s welfare as opposed to their own benefit and, therefore, avoid applying fairness
frameworks or demonstrate adversarial behavior.
Moreover, when an objective function aspires for asocial outcomes, applying fairness may come to
exacerbate problems. Decontextualized from the goal of the system, fairness solutions may ensure
that subgroups of the population are equally affected by the algorithm, only considering the distri-
bution of outcomes as they are aligned with the goal of the algorithm. In other words, failing to
question the system’s utility may not consider whether the objective function itself is just, ensuring
only that people are equally subject to its effects [30, 31]. For instance, a predictive policing applica-
tion that is constrained for fairness but does not take into account the negative effects that predictive
policing has on vulnerable populations, or a credit scoring algorithm that is tuned to ensure that
sub-prime loans are fairly distributed, are likely to lead to unjust outcomes. A notable exception to
this frame in fairness literature is written in Corbett-Davies et al. [32] which considers the impact on
utility in the form of a measure of public safety. Decontextualization can further intensify negative
outcomes when OSPs pick fairness frameworks that limit their engagement to legal conceptions of
protected identities, skirting more complex problems that cannot be reduced to “identity attributes”
or the “cause-and-effect” model inherent to legal definitions [33]. Such models may be depicted as
fair while avoiding responding to unjust outcomes.
The asociality of the objective function may be concealed by blindness to allocation of resources.
The quality of an allocation can be determined by different qualities, including, but not limited to,
fairness. For example, one could consider that the sum of all payoffs should be as high as possible,
or that the worst-off agents in a system should be as well-off as possible. One could also consider
injustice in greater time frames and use models that engage in restorative justice [34]. While fairness
will aspire for parity in allocation of resources, it does not always consider these other qualities.
For example, fairness guarantees may be applied to the rider-driver matching algorithms with the
intention to ensure that Uber drivers are equally likely to find riders, access surges, and earn similar
wages regardless of their belonging to a protected class. This does not, however, deal with the fact
that Uber optimizes the matching to maximize profit while minimizing driver wages. In such an
instance, distributing suppressed wages fairly is not quite the ultimate objective.
Even when OSPs have incentives to address relevant problems optimization causes through fairness,
they may not be in a position to do so. OSPs may lack knowledge about the needs of those affected
by optimization, even when they strive to collect the necessary data to mend optimization outcomes:
such (environmental) data may simply not be available for capture. In practice, data often repre-
sents what is easy to capture and thus provides a biased account of the people and environments it
supposedly measures, leaving out key nuances required to improve optimization [35].
Fairness literature often considers decision-making as static, i.e., the algorithm and the environment
in which it is deployed are fixed. However, under optimization systems, the decision-making model
does change, e.g., predictive policing results in increased crime reporting for patrolled neighbor-
hoods if the algorithm is not updated to account for the fact that police visit certain neighborhoods
more often than others [36]. While exceptions exist in which future changes of environments are
considered, e.g., the work on fairness in reinforcement learning [37], in general fairness disregards
problems that go beyond discrimination in algorithmic decision making and is therefore ill-equipped
to prevent the negative effects that arise when agents evolve [38].
Fairness also often stays limited to analyzing an algorithm’s inputs and outputs, but in optimization
systems many externalities occur only after the system is introduced into an environment. Because
the state that fairness considers often does not reflect changes in the environment, fairness solutions
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are made unaware of and cannot account for most externalities that surface post-deployment. For
example, Waze may provide its users with optimal routes in a way that satisfies a given notion of
fairness. However, fairness cannot reason about the effect that the fair routes have on the envi-
ronments that those routes traverse, i.e., congestion may increase on surface roads. This impact,
especially when multiple routing applications are at play, may become evident only after deploy-
ment. Moreover, because fairness solutions are intended to be deployed by OSPs, they are often
limited to protecting only their users, while disregarding the non-users. Waze, for example, has no
explicit way of getting feedback from people who are affected by its routing decisions, yet do not
use the application.
We argue that OSPs should internalize potential harms and risks, e.g., through stringent design prac-
tices, regulation and taxation, and democratic forms of governance. Short of this, we can consider
OSPs as potentially unable, lacking incentives, or unwilling to address the externalities of their
optimization systems, rather than considering these as the result of poor design choices or accidents.
3 Rethinking the trust model: solutions from the outside
The points above indicate that fairness, conceptually and with respect to its assumptions about the
trust and ability of OSPs, is limited in its capacity to respond to externalities of optimization systems.
We need new mental models and techniques that enable designers to reason about strategies that not
only counter the negative effects of optimization from within the system, but also from outside of the
system. Furthermore, we may need to capture alternative optimization functions that are different
from those embedded in the service provider’s own optimization algorithms, to the extent that they
may consider variables and contour conditions not even present in the original optimization system.
We propose that approaches to mitigate the externalities of optimization systems should build on al-
ternative trust models that do not rely solely on OSPs and should consider factors of the environment
not explicitly present in the machine learning models. A number of existing works have considering
hedging OSPs against users “gaming” the optimization system in their favor [39, 40]. Protecting the
optimization system or striving for an equilibrium between adversarial users and the system’s goals,
however, have been shown to reinforce inequality [41] and disproportionately benefit the OSPs [42].
With this in mind we invite the community to think about how to design and implement a new class
of defenses to enable those affected by optimization systems to influence, alter, and counter these
systems from the outside. We call these defenses Protective Optimization Technologies (POTs).
POTs respond to the discontents of machine learning that fairness frameworks cannot completely
address. They are intended to empower people and environments affected by optimization systems to
intervene when OSPs fail to respond to their needs. They rely on explicit modeling and evaluation
of the impact of optimization systems on populations and environments, broadening the scope of
unfairness and mitigation techniques.
POTs development requires to analyze how events (or lack thereof) affect users and environments,
and then find the means to reconfigure these events, i.e., influence the system’s outcomes, by poi-
soning the training data thus modifying the optimization constraints, or crafting alternative system
inputs to counteract the optimization effect. We specifically conceive POTs to address the negative
externalities of optimization, and as such it is crucial to take a holistic perspective, considering the
interaction of the algorithm with the rest of the optimization system and the environment. These
ideas are inspired by people’s strategies to counter the negative effects of optimization systems by
manipulating inputs to the system and not changing the algorithms themselves, in order to achieve a
desired, more balanced, output. For instance, neighborhood dwellers negatively affected by Waze’s
routing have fought back by reporting road closures and heavy traffic on their streets — to have
Waze redirect users out of their neighborhoods. Uber drivers have colluded to induce surge pricing
and temporarily increase their revenue by simultaneously turning off their apps, inducing surge, and
turning the app back on to take advantage of the increased pricing in the area [43]. Adnauseam,
a browser plugin seeks to pollute advertisting systems’ profiling by clicking on random ads in the
background in order to render inferred user profiles useless.
These ad-hoc examples demonstrate that it is possible to counter optimization externalities from the
outside. As such, their principles can inspire the design of more formal POTs. For instance, these
could be based on adversarial machine learning techniques used to bias the optimization system re-
sponses to reduce their negative impact on users and environment. Such an idea appears in recent
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calls to develop POTs for civil liberties [44], and is already prevalent in Privacy-Enhancing Tech-
nologies (PETs) literature [45–47] — in the spirit of which we attend to the optimization problem.
In this position paper we are just scratching the surface of the problem and the possible solution
space. We hope that this inspires the community to engage in a deep discussion about the assump-
tions underlying current solutions. We consider this an indispensable step before we can build
effective robust solutions to address the negative effects of machine learning, and more broadly
optimization systems.
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